Editorial: Bangladesh's Risky Border Play Is Escalating Arakan's War and Imperiling Repatriation

By Admin 15 Nov 2025

Bangladesh's "Arakan Corridor" proposal may have been shelved, but the underlying approach has not changed: arm, train, and instrumentalize Muslim armed groups while pushing for rapid repatriation that ignores political and security realities on the ground in Arakan. The result is a combustible border, rising civilian harm on both sides, and a steadily shrinking space for a viable, dignified return.

This is not a theoretical risk. Over the past six months, northern Arakan has seen a surge of cross-border ambushes, kidnappings, and mine attacks attributed to Muslim armed organizations - principally the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) and the Rohingya Solidarity Organisation (RSO) - alongside allegations of permissive or collusive behavior by certain Bangladeshi security elements.

Simultaneously, reports from Bangladesh describe training, re-arming, and expanding logistics routes for these groups. Meanwhile, the Arakan Army (AA), now administering most of Arakan State and nearly the entire 270-km frontier, is fighting the junta on multiple fronts while also conducting clearance operations against armed infiltrators along the Naf and in the Mayu range.

The border is becoming the war's new center of gravity. If Dhaka's policy aim is repatriation, this is the wrong road.

A Corridor by Other Means

The public "Arakan Corridor" - marketed as a humanitarian passage for aid, evacuations, and eventual returns - collapsed under domestic backlash in Bangladesh and military pushback in the region. But the logic behind it persists: carve out leverage inside Arakan, then translate that leverage into a Dhaka-led framework for returns.

Recent signals from Bangladesh include:

■ Stepped-up training and arming of Muslim cadres;

■ Tolerance for cross-border staging by armed groups;

■ Hardening of the frontier by the BGB even as armed elements move in the border's shadow; and

■ Diplomatic pressure campaigns abroad that downplay the role of armed groups while casting the AA as the principal obstacle.

This is a perilous inversion. The AA is the indispensable ground authority for any safe, phased return. Sidestepping that reality by empowering non-state armed actors is a recipe for more bloodshed and deeper mistrust - including among Muslim civilians inside Arakan who are already paying the price for ARSA/RSO abuses.

The Human Cost of Proxy Tactics

In October alone, ambushes and bombings on the Mayu corridor and the Kyein Chaung-Taung Pyo Letwae road killed traders and passengers - including women - and saw villagers abducted near the foothills. Over six months, dozens of civilians have been killed or injured in ARSA-linked attacks. Coastal units report incursions by armed Bangladeshi fishing crews into Arakan's waters, with deadly clashes at sea.

These are not "pressure points" that quicken repatriation. They harden lines, stall commerce, terrify border communities of every identity, and invite escalation between armed forces across an international boundary.

Dhaka's Strategic Misread

Bangladesh faces genuine burdens in hosting over a million refugees. But the emerging securitized approach makes three strategic errors:

1. Confusing leverage with legitimacy. Arming or tolerating armed groups may generate short-term pressure, but it destroys the legitimacy essential for a sustainable return framework accepted by communities inside Arakan.

2. Misreading the power map. The AA/ULA governs the terrain to which refugees would return. Any scheme that bypasses or seeks to weaken that authority - especially by proxy violence - will fail and prolong exile.

3. Internationalizing the frontline. Allegations of BGB complicity and junta naval resupply near St. Martin's risk entangling state forces, widening the war, and undermining Dhaka's own security.

What a Pragmatic Path Would Look Like

If the objective is voluntary, safe, dignified repatriation, policy must pivot from proxy warfare to practical engagement:

■ Open a direct AA-Dhaka channel (track-one-and-a-half if necessary) focused on border de-confliction, phased returns, and community security guarantees - with time-bound benchmarks and third-party facilitation.

■ Announce and enforce zero tolerance for cross-border staging by armed groups. Investigate alleged collusion by any BGB elements; prosecute violators; publicly report outcomes.

■ Shut the weapons pipelines. Establish joint maritime/riverine monitoring around St. Martin's and the Naf; enable credible, independent oversight of seizures; and coordinate hotlines between AA coastal units and Bangladeshi forces to prevent deadly encounters at sea.

■ Decouple humanitarian aid from militarization. Any corridor-like functions must be strictly civilian, with neutral monitoring - no armed escorts that morph into cover for factional resupply.

■ Pilot micro-returns, not mass movements. Start with family reunification and high-consensus villages, tied to AA/United League of Arakan (ULA) administrative vetting, property adjudication, and donor-funded livelihoods - and expand only after verified success.

■ Protect all civilians, equally. Condemn and sanction ARSA/RSO abuses as firmly as any alleged AA violations. Consistent standards build the trust that repatriation requires.

■ De-escalate the information war. Diaspora rhetoric demanding maximalist political outcomes may play well abroad but endangers Muslims inside Arakan. Advocacy should support coexistence and local inclusion, not sectarian mobilization.

A Note to Naypyidaw - and to Donors

The junta's tactic of courting Muslim armed factions last year to blunt the AA in Maungdaw helped seed today's insecurity. Its alleged naval resupply games, if verified, are reckless and should trigger targeted sanctions on involved units. Donors, for their part, must interrogate any aid architecture that can be diverted by armed actors and should back field-based, AA-engaged protection arrangements that demonstrably reduce harm.

The Choice Before Us

Arakan's border can either become a jointly managed seam for phased return and commerce - or a permanent fault line that condemns refugees to limbo and border communities to fear. Bangladesh holds a key, but so does the AA. The first step is the same for both: stop using armed proxies to solve a political problem. Put civilians first, talk directly, and test practical solutions at village scale.

Anything less is a gamble with other people's lives.